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LOSS CARRYOVERS IN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS
Edward J. Hawkins, Jr.1
Just as any benefit in excess may become a burden, so an excess of
net operating losses, despite the tax advantages, many prove detrimental
to the continued existence of a business. In some such cases, the business
dearly dies, and its loss carryovers dearly perish with it. The problem to
be considered in this article, however, is whether the loss carryovers also
perish if, instead of dying, the business undergoes an insolvency reorgani-
zation and re-emerges for another try, carrying on much the same opera-
tions as before but stripped of much of its former debt burden.
This question has been considered in three recent cases, and the de-
cisions of the courts in these cases have been unanimous in denying the
loss carryover. It is the thesis of this article, however, that for many in-
solvency situations, these cases are either distinguishable or wrong, and
that while only a very brave attorney would give an unqualified opinion
in any insolvency proceeding that the loss carryover will be available, only
an unnecessarily pessimistic attorney would conclude that in every case
the carryover is hopeless."
LOSS CARRYOVER TO NEW ENTITY VIA SECTION 381
Section 381 expressly authorizes the transfer of a net operating loss
from one corporate entity to another in transactions meeting certain re-
quirements. The requirements here relevant are that the transaction be
described in section 361, and be pursuant to certain definitions of reor-
ganization contained in section 368.2 The question is whether these re-
quirements are met in an insolvency reorganization.
The structure of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 implies that in-
solvency reorganizations are not within the meaning of sections 361 and
368. Insolvency reorganizations are specifically covered by sections 371-
82, and section 371 is almost parallel to sections 361 and 354, which
deal with reorganizations generally. The definitions of section 368, fur-
1. Acknowledgement is made of valuable suggestions in the preparation of this article by the
late George Cameron, Esq.
la. The three cases in question are Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1961) (discussed below at 286); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 750
(Cr. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962) (discussed below at 280); and Huyler's,
38 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 30, 1962) (discussed below at 285).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381 (a) (2), 361, 368 [hereinafter cited as CODE §]. The
requirements of CODE § 381 have been discussed in Adelson, Carrying Losses to a Different
Taxpayer, at 262 supra.
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thermore, are expressly made applicable only to that part of subchapter C
preceding sections 371-74.3
That a choice is intended between the application of sections 361 and
368, on the one hand, and the insolvency sections, on the other hand, may
also be indicated by the fact that section 381 expressly provides certain
results for transactions falling within section 361, but makes no reference
to section 371. Perhaps more important is the fact that the receipt of
boot by the stockholders of an old corporation is treated differently in an
exchange governed by section 354 than in an exchange governed by sec-
tion 371.' Hence, both sections cannot apply, and, if a choice must be
made, the section more specifically dealing with insolvencies normally
would be assumed to govern.
To balance the foregoing arguments for the non-applicability of sec-
tion 381, three contrary considerations should be noted.
Legislative History
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court held that it was possible
for insolvency reorganizations to qualify within the general reorganiza-
tion definitions in certain early revenue acts.5 Two years later the statu-
tory provisions now contained in section 371 were introduced in the Sen-
ate. The Senate Finance Committee adopted a provision governing all
insolvency reorganizations, differing in treatment from the provisions
governing normal reorganizations, and stated that the reorganization pro-
visions now contained in sections 354 and 361 "shall not apply to any
transaction within the provisions of this paragraph."' This provision, if
enacted, would clearly have resolved the problem of overlapping defini-
nitions. On the floor of the Senate, however, the Committee's version
was replaced by the present statutory framework. Senator Johnson, its
author, stated the purpose of the change as follows:
It attempts to give to a corporation going through insolvency pro-
ceedings exactly the same treatment which is accorded solvent com-
panies should they reorganize. If a solvent company were to reorganize
today, it would have a certain status and certain tax advantages because
of the historical basis allowed it as a policy of the tax laws enacted by
the Congress, but the Treasury has contended that a company which be-
3. CODE 9 361 refers to an exchange "in a pursuance of the plan of reorganization." CODE
§ 371 refers to a transfer to a corporation organized "to effectuate a plan of reorganization."
The words "plan of reorganization" have a different meaning in the two cases, however, since
CODE § 361 but not CODE § 371 is governed by the reorganization definitions in CODE § 368.
Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1 (a) (4) (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reg. ]. H.R. REP. No. 1079,
78th Cong., 2d Sess.; 1944 CuM. BULL. 1059, 1067.
4. Boot may be taxed as a dividend under CODE §§ 354 and 35 6 (a), but not under CODE 5
371 (b).
5. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942); Palm Springs Hold-
ing Corp. v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 185 (1942).
6. 90 GONG. REc .98 (1944).
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comes insolvent, when it comes out of insolvency and reorganizes must
start out as a new company, and, therefore, if it comes out as a new
company naturally it loses the historical basis for tax treatment which is'
accorded all other companies. The object of this amendment is not to
give an insolvent company any advantage or to take anything away from
it, but to maintain the status quo. That is the object of the amend-
ment.7
This language, combined with the elimination of the Committee provi-
sion making the insolvency provisions exclusive, might also be deemed to
resolve the question. It is doubtful, however, if the quoted statement
does accurately set forth the purpose of the amendment,8 and correspond-
ing language is conspicious by its absence from the conference report.9
Nevertheless, the overall point of the legislation seems to have been not
to preclude the application of sections 354 and 361, but to assure that
the rules of those and related sections would in fact be applicable to in-
solvency reorganizations.
Statutory Interpretation
A second reason for permitting the application of section 381 rests on
statutory interpretation. Section 371 is not in itself inconsistent with the
application of section 381. If an insolvency reorganization also literally
qualifies under section 368 - which it may'0 - the literal meaning of
the Code is that it also qualifies for the consequences of section 368, such
as section 381.
There are many other illustrations of overlapping Code provisions,
and if one is meant to exclude the other, Congress has found the words
necessary to say this." The inconsistency as to boot is troublesome, but
perhaps unreal. It could arise only where the insolvent corporation
makes a distribution out of earnings and profits that would be taxable
as a dividend under section 356(a) (2). If not impossible, this is at
least so unlikely an event that it is doubtful if it should control the ex-
tremely real and important problem of loss carryovers.
Inapplicability of Section 381
A final reason for permitting section 381 to cover qualified insol-
vency reorganizations is that not all insolvency reorganizations are coy-
7. 90 CONG. REc. 191 (1944).
8. The net effect of the change actually made by Senator Johnson seems to have related not
to the corporate entity but to preserving a tax shelter for speculators in railroad bonds.
9. H.R. REp. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; 1944 CuM. BULL. 1059, 1067 (1944).
10. For close analysis of this point see Krantz, Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations,
16 TAX L. REV. 359, 367-74 (1961). In Ohio, the most practical procedure would seem to
be under CODE § 368 (a) (1) (C), although a statutory merger might be workable in some
cases.
11. See, e.g., the first phrase of CODE 5 301 (a) : "Except as otherwise provided in this chap-
ter...."; also CODE §§ 318(a) (4) (C); 368(a) (2) (A); 671.
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ered by section 371. An example of such a reorganization would be a
transfer not pursuant to court order. It would seem odd if the court-
directed exchange, for which Congress especially wished to assure reor-
ganization-like treatment, must receive worse treatment as to carryovers
than a type of exchange which Congress did not attempt to protect. Con-
versely, should the non-court insolvency exchange be denied the benefits
of section 381 simply because if court-directed it would have been within
section 371? This is meant as a strictly rhetorical question.
Another route for avoiding the overlap between sections 361 and
371 would be an exchange of stock and debt interests in the insolvent
corporation solely for voting stock of a successor corporation, if this
proved practical. Subject to the possibility discussed below' that a re-
capitalization of a single company will cut off carryovers, such an ex-
change would seem to set the stage for the successful application of sec-
tion 381 (a) (1) relating to liquidations of subsidiaries under section 332,
without the necessity of a reorganization qualifying under section
381(a) (2)."3
The liquidation step, standing alone, would seem clearly to fall with-
in section 332, and without section 37 1." Of course, if the stock exchange
and liquidation were too closely connected in purpose and time, the Com-
missioner would attempt to apply the step transaction doctrine. Applica-
tion of the step transaction doctrine, however, simply brings the transac-
tion within section 368 (a) (1) (C), which would also achieve the ob-
jective of qualifying the transaction under section 381."5 To defeat
application of section 381, it would be necessary to bring the transaction
within section 371, which would seem possible only if the liquidation step
were pursuant to court order.
Possible Problems Under Section 382(b)
Assuming, without deciding, that the foregoing considerations have
been sufficient to bring an insolvency reorganization within section 381,
the loss carryover may still be defeated by section 382(b). Section 382
(b) applies to all reorganization exchanges (but not liquidations) which
qualify under section 381. If applicable, its effect can only be avoided
12. See discussion in text at 283-88, esp. 287-88 infra.
13. A loss carryover in a transaction following this pattern, but without the liquidation step,
was permitted by Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 80.
14. Reg. § 1.371-1 (a) (3) (1955) might seem to extend the statutory language of CODE 5
371 to cover the case supposed. Whether such a Regulation would be effective to override the
clear application of another statutory section is uncertain.
15. Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a) (6) (1960). The taxpayer is not indifferent as between a
liquidation and a reorganization, however, since CODE 5 382 (b) applies to the latter but not
the former. The Commissioner may find that flor his viewpoint as well, bringing transactions
within CODE § 368 (a) (1) (C) is a precedent not without danger. See BITTKER, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 366 n.10 (1959).
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by meeting one of two tests. The first, hereafter referred to as the "twenty
per cent test," is that the shareholders of the loss company immediately
before the reorganization own immediately after reorganization, as the re-
sult of owning stock of the loss company, twenty per cent of the stock of
the new company." The second test, hereafter referred to as the "com-
mon ownership test," is that both the loss company and the new company
be "owned substantially by the same persons in the same proportion."''
Prima fade, neither test would be met in an insolvency transfer to a
new corporation if the shareholders of the loss company had been elimi-
nated, completely or almost completely. On the other hand, at some point
in such a reorganization process, the creditors must have ceased to have
simply a fixed interest, and have acquired an effective command over the
assets of the business as a whole. This process has been described by the
Supreme Court as follows:
When the equity owners are excluded and the old creditors become
the stockholders of the new corporation, it conforms to realities to
date their equity ownership from the time when they invoked the proc-
esses of the law to enforce their rights of full priority. At that time
they stepped into the shoes of the old stockholders. The sale 'did noth-
ing but recognize officially what had before been true in fact.' 8
It will be noted that the twenty per cent test turns on stock ownership
immediately before the reorganization, and that the Supreme Court seems
to place the shifting shoes phenomenon somewhat earlier in time.
On the other hand, the foregoing quotation related only to the stock
ownership necessary to satisfy the "continuity of interest" rule. On the
very same day, in a different case, the Court also discussed the applicabil-
ity to an insolvency reorganization of what is now section 368(a) (1)-
(D). That definition requires control in the transferor corporation or
its "shareholders," and the creditors did not qualify:
But it is one thing to say that the bondholders 'stepped into the shoes
of the old stockholders' so as to acquire the proprietary interestin the
insolvent company. It is quite another to say that they were the 'stock-
holders' of the old company within the purview of clause (C). In the
latter, Congress was describing an existing, specified class of security
holders of the transferor corporation. That class, as we have seen, re-
ceived a participation in the plan of reorganization....
Indeed, clause (C) contemplates that the old corporation or its stock-
holders, rather than its creditors, shall be in the dominant position of
'control' immediately after the transfer and not excluded or relegated
to a minority position. Plainly the normal pattern of insolvency re-
organization does not fit its requirements.' 9
16. CODE § 382(b) (1) (B).
17. CODE § 382(b) (3).
18. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184 (1942) (Douglas, J.).
19. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942) (Douglas, J.).
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If the creditors have not stepped into the former owners' shoes suf-
ficiently to become "shareholders" for purposes of section 368 (a) (1)-
(D), it is doubtful if they have become "stockholders" for purposes of
the twenty per cent test of section 382(b). The common ownership
test, however, like the concept of continuity of interest, is less specific.
To be precise, one should refer either to ownership of a corporation's
stock or to ownership of the corporation's assets, neither of which is ex-
actly ownership of the corporation. The fact that both alternatives were
avoided, and a mongrel criterion used instead, suggests that a very practi-
cal concept of ownership was intended. This is exactly the sort of real
but inelegant ownership which the Supreme Court has found the creditors
to possess in an insolvency reorganization. Indeed, even the ambiguity
between ownership of stock and ownership of the corporation's assets
is present in the Court's position. Thus, a few months after the decisions
quoted above, the Court held that the creditors in an insolvency reorgani-
zation qualify as the owners of the assets of the insolvent company for
purposes of what is now section 351.
Under that approach the ownership of the equity in these debtor
companies effectively passed to these creditors at least when §77B
proceedings were instituted. But however their interest in the property
may be described, it dearly was an equitable claim in or to it. It was
the equitable interest with which the plan dealt ... Thus it is fair to
say that the property transferred was property in which the creditors
had an equitable interest, and that the transfer was made with their au-
thority and on their behalf. Certainly, 'property,' as used in §112(b)-
(5), includes such an interest in property. And we see no reason to
conclude that a beneficial owner of, or equitable claimant to, property
is precluded from consummating an exchange which qualifies under
§112 (b) (5) merely because the actual conveyance is made by his trustee
or title holder.20
On the basis of Alabama Asphaltic and Cement Investors, it is pre-
dicted that any court willing to surmount the problems of bringing an
insolvency reorganization within section 381 in the first place will have
little trouble with section 382 (b). Even the requirement that the com-
mon ownership be "in the same proportion" should be readily met if the
insolvency exchange does "nothing but recognize officially what had be-
fore been true in fact."'"
The remaining hurdles, Libson Shops22 and section 269, are easier.
20. Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 532 (1942) (Douglas, J.).
21. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship of the common ownership test to insol-
vency reorganizations, see Krantz, Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations, 16 TAX L.
REV. 359, 374-86 (1961). The author there discusses, inter alia, the question of creditor
"ownership" where some creditors receive stock and others remain creditors. At least where
the two groups of creditors are in separate classes, this problem seems resolved by the highly
practical, though incomplete, application of the "shifting shoes" doctrine in Rev. Rul. 50-222,
1952-1 CUM. BULL. 80. But cf. Krantz, supra at 402.
22. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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The Commissioner has stated that he will not apply Libson Shops to
carryovers governed by section 381." Section 269 is inapplicable unless
the tax benefit is the principal purpose of the transaction." Where
control of the new corporation is in the hands of former creditors, their
business reasons for participating in the reorganization would seem over-
whelming. Furthermore, any plan under Chapter X, or arrangement un-
der Chapter XI, is submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury in advance,
and, under Chapter X, the judge shall "refuse to confirm the plan" if
"tax avoidance" is even one of the principal purposes.25
Loss CARRYOVER TO NEW ENTITY WITHOUT SECTION 381
Non-Statutory Principles
A considerable body of case law had developed as to loss carryovers
in reorganizations antedating section 381. If insolvency reorganizations
are not covered by section 381, it is with this case law that any analysis
must be concerned."
The story began inauspiciously in 1934 with New Colonial Ice Co.
v. HelveringY There, a company had been reorganized out of court,
but under pressure from creditors, in a transaction approximating the re-
organizations definitions now contained in section 368 (a) (1) (C) and
(D). This resulted in a new corporate entity owned by the same share-
holders, subject to the same creditors, and carrying on the same business,
and the issue was whether the net operating losses of the old corporate
entity also carried over. The Supreme Court resolutely set its face against
what might loosely be termed "business realities," and denied the deduc-
tion on the ground that the technical change in corporate entity was
determinative.
The unappealing New Colonial Ice rule gave rise to considerable
litigation in the course of which a line of authority developed permitting
loss carryovers to a different entity provided the reorganization plan was
a statutory merger." This merger exception reached the Supreme Court
in 1957, in Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler," but the Court avoided the
23. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 147.
24. See Harvey, Acquisitions to Obtain Benefits of Losses-Section 269, at 294 infra.
25. BANKRUPTcY Acr, Chap. X, § 266-69, 52 Stat. 903, 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 666-69
(1958); BANKRUPTcy AcT, Chap. XI, §§ 394-95, 52 Stat. 915, 916 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 5
794-95 (1958).
26. The fact that CODE § 381 does not cover a transaction does not in itself bar a carryover.
See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
27. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
28. E.g., Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956) (Magruder,
J.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957). Cf. Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
573 (2d Cir. 1949) (excess profits credit carryover).
29. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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entire corporate entity question, returned to "business realities," and de-
nied the deduction on the ground that the loss arose in a different busi-
ness operation from that which sought the benefit of the carryover.
Libson Shops was followed by Revenue Ruling 59-395,"0 in which
the Internal Revenue Service stated its own view of the net effect of the
foregoing cases. It held that losses may be carried over or back across a
reorganization exchange governed by the 1939 Code provided, first, that
the reorganization was in the form of a statutory merger or consolidation,
and, second, that the income and loss both arose from the same assets used
in the same business operation. The illogical distinction between mergers
and other forms of reorganization was maintained, as the most doubtful
point of the ruling. In F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States,3" the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit had already rejected the distinction and
held that a carryover or carryback was permissible across the line of any
tax-free reorganization.
The foregoing authorities relating to the reorganization of solvent
corporations were sought to be applied to a reorganization under section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act in Wisconsin Cent. R. R. Co. v. United States.
2
There a loss carryback to the corporate predecessor was attempted across
the line of a reorganization which had wiped out the predecessor's com-
mon stockholders, preferred stockholders, and unsecured creditors.
In its opinion, the Court of Claims pointed out that the transaction
in question did not qualify even under the most liberal exceptions to the
New Colonial Ice corporate entity test: it was not a statutory merger or
consolidation, and, in fact, it was not a tax-free reorganization at all."3
This would seem to have ended the case, but the Court of Claims pro-
ceeded to another area, which it seemed to regard as still more important.
This was the "continuing enterprise" test of Libson Shops. The Court of
30. 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 475.
31. 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958) (Magruder, J.). Thc legal entity test was held to defeat
the purpose of the statutory provisions relating to reorgai "z.tions, and the New Colonial Ice
case was distinguished on the ground that it was decided uader a Revenue Act antedating the
reorganization provisions. The government did not seek certiorari. See also, Koppers Co. v.
United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 32-33, 134 F. Supp. 290, 296-97 (1955), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 983 (1957). But cf. Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776 (7th
Cir. 1957). New Colonial Ice may be further distinguished under the 1954 Code. There
the Supreme Court stressed the statutory wording that the same "taxpayer" get the carryover
as the "taxpayer" which incurred the loss. The "taxpayer" wording was omitted from the
1954 Code.
32. 296 F.2d 750 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962). Before the Libson
Shops decision, loss carryovers and carrybacks across the line of a Section 77B reorganization
(not a merger) were denied by the simple application of the New Colonial Ice legal entity
test. Donohue v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mo. 1953); Follansbee Steel Corp.
v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
33. Insolvency reorganizations governed by CODE §§ 371, 374 are tax free. Certain railroad
insolvency reorganizations before August 1, 1955, are governed by CODE § 373 and its 1939
Code predecessor, § 112 (b) (9), which provided for a carryover of basis and non-recognition
of loss, but gain to the corporate transferor is recognized.
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Claims held that this test had not been met since the new company had
not assumed all of the predecessor's debts, all of the old stockholders
had been eliminated, and the new stockholders were some of the former
creditors of the business.
Since the Wisconsin Cent. R. R. case did not even involve a tax-
free reorganization, its result, the denial of the carryback, would seem
correct. The argument that this result was compelled by a change
in stock ownership, however, seems unfortunate. A change in owner-
ship is an important factor in determining whether the elements of con-
tinuity in a reorganization outweigh the elements of discontinuity, i. e.,
whether the transaction was really a sale. It is not a recently discovered
factor, however. The statute has long imposed requirements as to the na-
ture of the consideration in a reorganization and dealt expressly with
acquisitions of corporate ownership for a tax purpose. Even more in
point, the courts have developed the "continuity of interest" test to meet
precisely this question. It is not a simple matter: the change can come
in many forms and degrees, and dearly a special dimension is added to
the problem when the new owners are former creditors. According1j,
the case law is extensive, and includes the Alabama Asphaltic decision
and several lower court decisions dealing specifically with the question of
the change of status from creditor to stockholder in an insolvency re-
organization.34
The Court of Claims' position seems to be, however, that Libson
Shops has, in fact, imposed a new requirement as to stock ownership as
a condition of loss carryovers, and thus, whether wisely or not, the Su-
preme Court has spoken. The Court of Claims expressed the point as
follows:
We do not feel that the rules developed in reference to continuity
of interest in the Alabama Asphaltic sense are equally applicable to a de-
termination of continuing ownership in the Libson Shops sense.35
This language is particularly curious since Libson Shops involved no
change in ownership and made no reference to change in ownership. In
context, that opinion dealt unmistakably with the single question of the
nature of the business operation being carried on. No one contended
that the loss-carryover could survive unless the merger had been tax-
34. It might be suggested that the "continuity of interest" test relates to whether a reorganiza-
tion is tax-free at all, and that a stricter test as to ownership is appropriate in determining
when a loss carryover is to be allowed. The problem is that a corporation has many attributes;
CODE § 381 (c) lists twenty-two and is not complete. For all or most of these, the same basic
question of continuity obtains, but many differences in degree might be defensible. Never-
theless, to apply a different test to the change of ownership elemaent in the overall continuity
problem for each individual carryover item, and to do this through the uncertainties of judicial
legislation, would seem to add a wholly impractical burden of complexity and uncertainty to
a field already complex and uncertain.
35. 296 F.2d 750, 755 n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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free, and this depended in part upon there being sufficient continuity of
interest (ownership). Hence, the question of continuing ownership had
been met once as a condition of even reaching the question dealt with by
the Supreme Court, i.e., the effect on a carryover of a tax-free merger.
Thus, there was no reason for the Court to deal with the question again,
and there is no indication whatever that it intended to do so.36
Libson Shops, in fact, supported the carryover. The Court there iden-
tified the critical factor as continuity in the business operation. That
continuity was present in Wisconsin Cent. R. R.
The Court of Claims' second reason for denying the loss carryover
was that the new corporate entity did not assume all of the debts of its
predecessor. If it is a rule that loss carryovers do not survive the can-
cellation of indebtedness, the question as to such carryovers is solved in
almost all insolvency reorganizations. Furthermore, such a rule would
not be without logic. Many of the expenses which gave rise to the debt
also presumably gave rise to the loss carryover. If the debt does not have
to be paid, the expenses in a sense have proved to be unreal, and the loss
carryover is also unreal. On the other hand, of course, there is no reason
to assume that the amount of the cancelled debt will be the same as the
amount of the loss carryover. Also, the losses are by no means unreal
from the standpoint of the creditors whose claims have been reduced or
who have been issued stock in place of debt.
The problem of balancing these conflicting factors is not easy, nor
is it limited to the question of loss carryovers. The same point as to "un-
real" expenditures bears upon the carryover of basis, the carryover of
earnings and profits, and the question of income from the discharge of
indebtedness. All these questions have histories of extended tax litiga-
tion, and the results have not been wholly consistent.87 Nevertheless,
the general pattern is that the cancellation of indebtedness in bankruptcy
proceedings does not break up tax continuity, and it would seem unfor-
tunate if an inconsistent rule were introduced as to loss carryovers, with-
out legislation and on the authority of a Supreme Court decision which
did not involve the point.
The problem of change of ownership and cancellation of indebted-
36. Although there is no support in Libson Shops for a new continuity of ownership test, it
may find support in certain language in F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470
(1st Cir. 1958), and Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961). Thus an
error may acquire respectability through repetition.
Part of the explanation for the Court of Claim's inadequate deference to the existing con-
tinuity of interest test may have been its excessive deference to that test in an earlier decision.
See Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. United States, 296 F.2d 750, 756 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
37. The questions of basis and of income from the discharge of indebtedness have resulted
in a complex body of law beyond the scope of this article. The result is simple, however, in
cases covered by CODE §§ 371, 372 and 374: no income is realized and basis is unchanged.
For the quite different result as to earnings and profits, see note 38 infra.
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ness may be presented in a different way. This is the theory that the
process by which the debt was reduced consisted of two steps: the distri-
bution of the corporation's assets to its creditors, and the contribution of
the assets by the creditors to a new corporation. On this theory, there
would be no direct relationship between the old corporation and the new
corporation and hence no grounds for carrying over net operating losses
or any other attribute of the old corporation.
The two-step analysis is not without judicial support, including the
Supreme Court's holding in Cement Investors" that the creditors owned,
at least equitably, the assets of the insolvent company. Nevertheless, it
leads to trouble. First, it is inconsistent with the general reincorporation
doctrine that where a corporation liquidates, and the business is promptly
reincorporated by the prior owners, the liquidation step is disregarded3
Second, the two-step analysis is inconsistent with the Alabama Asphaltic
doctrine' that the corporate entity continues and the creditors take over
an interest as shareholders, not as asset-owners. Third, the two-step
analysis conflicts with the statutory provision for carryover of basis.
Fourth, it would give rise to a taxable gain or loss on the hypothetical
liquidation."
To summarize, the decision in the Wisconsin Cent. R. R. case is cor-
rect, since it did not involve a tax-free reorganization in the first place.
It is neither good law nor good tax policy, however, to say that in a
tax-free insolvency reorganization, Libson Shops bars a carryover be-
cause of a change in stock ownership and the cancellation of indebted-
ness.
LOSS CARRYOVER IN SAME ENTITY
The 1954 Code denies the carryover of the net operating losses of a
continuing corporate entity in certain situations described in section 269
and section 382 (a). In many or most insolvency reorganizations section
38. Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527 (1942). See note 20 supra and ac-
companying text. The doctrine has also been applied to prevent the carryover of earnings and
profits, or a deficit therein, in insolvency reorganizations, whether or not involving a new cor-
porate entity. F. R. Humpage, 17 T.C. 1625 (1952), 66 HARv. L. REV. 358 (1952), non acq.,
1952-2 CuM. BULL 4, withdrawn and acq. substituted, 1962-29 INT. REV. BULL. 6 (July 16,
1962); United States v. Kavanagh, 308 F.2d 824, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9770 (8th Cir. 1962)
(semble); special ruling, 7 CCH 1962 STAND, FED. TAX. REP 5 6461 (July 13). Contra, El
Pomar Investment Co. v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 333 (D. Colo. 1962).
39. Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) (1955). Contra, Joseph Gallagher, 39 T.C. No. 13 (Oct. 17, 1962).
Perhaps it begs the question to assume that the reincorporation is by the former "owners."
40. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942). See note 18
supra and accompanying text.
41. Such a taxable liquidation would be contrary to the express provision of Reg. § 1.371-
2(a) (2) (1955) (last sentence), in a reorganization governed by CODE § 371.
42. If it is held that an insolvency reorganization permits a loss carryover outside of CODE S
381, the remaining problems do not seem difficult. As already noted, Libson Shops relates to
the business operation, which would be continued. CODE § 382(b) would not apply since
1963]
284 WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2
269 will be inapplicable for the reasons already discussed.4" The same
will probably be true of section 382(a). That section applies in cases
where there has been both a change in stock ownership and a change in
the nature of the business operation. However, the stock ownership test
is met only if the change occurs in a transaction such that the new stock-
holders do not have a carryover basis, which former creditors presumably
would have. Also, the reorganized company will usually continue to
operate substantially the same business, although there is some uncer-
tainty as to exactly how much is necessary to constitute a change in busi-
ness within the meaning of section 382."
Judicial Tests Under 1939 Code
In addition to meeting the statutory tests, there has been some con-
cern that in the case of continuing corporate entities the carryover of net
operating losses may be contingent upon meeting certain additional
judge-made tests. The analysis of this problem requires a brief review
of certain case law arising under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
For many years, the strictness of the New Colonial Ice doctrine in
denying loss carryovers to a new corporate entity led to complete freedom
for carryovers within the same entity. The carryover was not denied even
where both the nature of the business and the ownership of the business
changed completely.45
The legal atmosphere changed sharply when the Supreme Court, in
Libson Shops, denied a loss carryover because of a change in the business
operation. That case involved a merger, and the Supreme Court de-
clined to pass on the question of a change of business by a single cor-
porate entity.46 The Treasury, less hesitant, took the view that a change
in business by itself would destroy a loss carryover in a single continuing
corporation."
The courts which have ruled on the question so far have also been
willing to apply the test based on continuity of business operation to deny
loss carryovers in single corporate entities, but only where some other
change was added to the picture.4" In the cases decided so far, that ele-
its coverage is limited to reorganizations covered by CODE § 381. CODE § 382 (a) would
not apply since a new corporate entity would be involved. CODE § 269 should not apply for
the reasons discussed above. See discussion in text at 279 supra.
43. See discussion in text at 279 supra.
44. See Pomeroy, Limitations Where the Same Taxpayer Seeks to Carryover the Loss, supra
at 256-57.
45. E.g., Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
46. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 390 n.9 (1957).
47. This position was announced by the non acquiescence, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 8, in North-
way Securities Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), acq. withdrawn, X-2 CUM. BULL 52 (1931).
48. This modification of the rule avoids many problems: e.g., loss carryovers by a sole pro-
prietor, and loss carryovers based on casualty losses by an individual not in business. See
Pomeroy, supra note 44 at 259.
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ment has always been, or included, a substantial change in stock owner-
ship of the corporation.49
As has been discussed, Libson Shops did not deal with a change in
stock ownership, and the introduction of a new test based on stock own-
ership would be redundant and confusing in reorganization cases involv-
ing a new corporate entity.5" Where a single entity is involved, how-
ever, no "continuity of interest" test presently applies, except perhaps in
recapitalizations.51 Accordingly, a combination of a stock ownership test
and a business operations test might be a sensible and convenient solu-
tion for the problem of loss carryovers in single entities, for the cases
antedating the specific legislation on this point contained in the 1954
Code.
Simultaneously with the application of the new doctrine to solvent
corporations, an even more extreme group of cases has arisen in reference
to insolvency reorganizations. Logically, though not chronologically, the
first of these was Huyler's.5" Here, a restaurant corporation went through
a Chapter X reorganization in which the former shareholders were wiped
out. In addition, forty-eight per cent of the stock was issued to new in-
vestors. The restaurant business was gradually dropped, and an alum-
inum products business was added. Also, the former owners of the alum-
inum products business bought out the previous "new investors" and took
over management of the company.
The loss carryovers of the restaurant business were not allowed
against the aluminum profits because of the
... radical changes in the ownership of the business, in the capital structure
of the business, in the location of the business operations, in the manage-
ment of the business, and in the type of the business and its products.53
The decision seemed dearly right if the similar decisions relating to
solvent corporations were right. It was not even necessary to c6nsider
very closely the nature of the Chapter X adjustments. The degree of
change in stock ownership required as a make-weight or supplement to
a change in business operations has not been articulated, and perhaps
even the forty-eight per cent change after the reorganization would have
proved sufficient, especially since it seems to have been sufficient to trans-
fer control of the corporation."
49. See Pomeroy, supra note 44, at 259, nn.37 & 38.
50. See note 34 supra and the following three paragraphs of text.
51. Even in a recapitalization continuity of interest may not be required. See BrrrKER,
FEDERAL INcomm TAXATiON op CORpORATIONs AND SHAREHOLDERS, 396 (1959).
52. 38 T.C. No 77 (Aug. 30, 1962).
53. Md.
54. It seems likely that some of the forbidden loss carryover arose from restaurant operations
after the completion of the Chapter X reorganization but before the sale of stock to the alu-
minum interests. Also, the same judge, Pierce, who decided Huyler's also decided Norden-
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The second step was Willingham v. United States.5 Here, the same
corporate entity survived a Chapter X reorganization, and there was no
change in the kind of business carried on. On the other hand, part of its
debts were cancelled and all of its post-reorganization stock was held by
an entirely new investor, Mr. Willingham. The carryover of pre-reor-
ganization losses against post-reorganization profits was denied.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went through the custom-
ary ritual of stating that the "principal support" for the denial of the
carryover was Libson Shops. Since Libson Shops involved a change in
business operation, but no change in ownership, whereas Willingham
involved a change in ownership, but no change in business operation, this
is not self evident. Presumably, however, Libson Shops was broadly
read as holding that technicalities relating to continuity of corporate
charter are no longer controlling, and that courts are now free to examine
whatever other factors seem to them significant.
If, in a continuing corporation, a change in ownership, standing
alone, is ever to defeat a loss carryover, Willingham was correctly de-
cided. The transfer of all of the equity interest to a new investor would
presumably have precluded the transaction from qualifying as a reorgani-
zation, even for purposes of section 371 and its predecessors.56 Thus, if
a new corporate entity had been used, the carryover would have been lost
before even reaching the question of Libson Shops. On the other hand,
it should be remembered that the Commissioner firmly denies that the
carryover rules as to continuing corporate entities apply to most reorgan-
ization transfers to new entities."1 Thus, equating the two cannot be re-
garded as automatic justification of a decision.
In addition to the change of ownership in Willingham, the court also
stressed the cancellation of indebtedness, and again applied the universal
authority, Libson Shops:
[T]he carryover law, [was] 'designed,' as the Supreme Court said in
Libson, to 'permit a taxpayer to set off its lean years against its lush
years, and to strike something like an average taxable income over a
period longer than a year.' ...... This loss taxpayer 'set off its lean
years' by having them wiped out in reorganization proceedings.58
Ketay, 21 CCH TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 1316 (1962), which involved a change of business and
stock ownership in a solvent corporation. He held the Huyler's decision to be controlling:
"Also, in Huyler's, there was a Chapter X bankruptcy reorganization. But these are mere
distinctions, without any real underlying difference of legal principle which would call for a
different result here." Id. at 1317.
55. 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 828 (1961).
56. Reg. S 1.371-1 (a) (4) (1955); H.R. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944 CuM.
BULL. 1059, 1963. Compare Chicago Stadium Corp., 13 T.C. 889 (1949), with Atlas Oil &
Refining Corp., 36 T.C. 675 (1961), acq., 1962-31 INT. REV. BULL. 7.
57. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 475.
58. Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1961). The court also relied
on certain other features of the reorganization, in addition to the change of ownership and
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This argument was also involved in the Wisconsin Cent. R. R. case."
Willingham differs only in carrying the issue into the area of the can-
cellation of indebtedness of a continuing entity.
The next step in the progression was a Tax Court decision, Denver
& Rio Grande W. R. R.," which did not involve loss carryovers but
represented a development of Willingham. The railroad had been "re-
organized" under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, and the issue was
assumed to be whether an expense arising before or during the reorgani-
zation related to the trade or business of the corporation after the reor-
ganization. This in turn was said to depend upon whether there had
been a change in entity for tax purposes during the reorganization even
though the railroad had in fact continued to use the same corporate char-
ter. The Tax Court held that there was a change in entity and denied the
deduction. It noted that there had been changes in the charter, that "the
equity interest in the corporation was completely changed," and that the
"petitioner apparently did not assume all the debts of the old corpora-
tion." The court then cited and summarized Willingham.
Having decided that it was dealing with two corporate entities, the
Tax Court then pointed out that the deduction might be allowed by sec-
tion 381 (c) (16), which relates to reorganizations involving a change
in corporate entities. It held, however, that section 381 related only to
tax-free reorganizations, that this transaction qualified under section 373
and hence was not tax-free, and that if section 381 does not apply to a
situation, Congress intended to deny the deduction in question. "
Although the Denver & Rio Grande decision relies on Willingham,
it involves a significant difference as to change of ownership. In Wil-
lingham an entirely new investor bought up the stock of the corporate
entity. In Denver & Rio Grande the stock was apparently taken over
by former creditors in a change fully complying with the "continuity of
interest" test. It is one thing to say, with Willingham, that a change of
ownership which would defeat a carryover in an inter-corporate transfer
should also defeat the carryover in a continuing entity. It is much more
extreme to say that the single continuing entity should meet a stricter test.
A doctrine that an exchange of debt for stock may in itself create a
new taxable entity is of great importance not only for court-directed
bankruptcies but also for many "normal" recapitalizations. It is regret-
table that the Tax Court seems to have come dose to some such doctrine
with no real consideration of the issues. However, the court stated that
cancellation of debt, which were idiosyncrasies of the particular transaction and might serve
in the future as handles of distinction.
59. See text at 282-83 supra.
60. 38 T.C. No. 58 (Aug. 3, 1962).
61. The court is wrong as to the effect of CODE § 381 on transactions not covered thereby.
Reg. § 1.381(a)-1(b) (3) (1960); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 277 (1954).
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the petitioner did not contend it was the same entity, so that perhaps this
aspect of the case can be distinguished as simply an unlitigated concession
by the taxpayer.
EFFECT OF 1954 CODE
Regardless of the validity of the change of ownership test in cases
governed by the 1939 Code, it is to be assumed that the test will be in-
applicable under the 1954 Code. It is hard to conceive of the test being
applied to reorganizations of solvent corporations governed by section
381. Even the Treasury holds that the test based on change of business
operations is inapplicable in such a case,62 and that test, unlike the stock
ownership test, really does have support in Libson Shops. If a single con-
tinuing solvent corporation recapitalizes, or if its stock is purchased by a
new investor, the same result should follow for several reasons.
First, the 1954 Code expressly imposes restrictions on loss carryovers
both to new entities and in continuing entities based upon very specific
statutory tests as to change of stock ownership. It would seem an im-
proper exercise of the judicial function to supersede these specific statu-
tory tests with a general judge-made test that any substantial change of
stock ownership defeats the carryover.
Second, one purpose of the specific statutory tests was to defeat carry-
overs in the specified cases. A second purpose was, by instituting an ob-
jective test, to reduce the reliance on section 269 which had "been so un-
certain in its effects as to place a premium on litigation and a damper on
valid business transactions."6  The effect on the uncertainty level of re-
placing the statute's objective tests with the case law discussed in this
article would be - one searches in vain for an adequate word.
Third, the 1954 Code expressly provides for the carryover of losses
to different entities where certain explicit conditions are met. It is the
clear meaning of the Comhmittee Reports that this is intended to equate
the specified reorganizations with the treatment of single continuing en-
tities, not to create an advantage in favor of transfers to new entities.
Fourth, any attempt by judicial legislation to apply either a change-
of-ownership or change-of-business-operation test to single corporations
but not to reorganizations covered by section 381 involves great con-
ceptual difficulty, in addition to violating the congressional purposes dis-
cussed above. The tests in question are assumed to arise under section
172, and section 381 allows the deduction only of "carryovers determined
under section 172." Therefore, if the tests apply at all, they would seem
to apply to transactions under section 381. If not, there is a new
difficulty. The effect of the tests on a single entity is to divide it into
62. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 147.
63. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
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two entities. A transaction which is outside section 381 if involving one
entity may be within it if involving two entities, and hence the tests in
question may have the effect of bringing the transaction within a section
to which the tests do not apply. This was the problem which the Tax
Court faced in Denver & Rio Grande, but was able to avoid on the ground
that even with two entities the transaction was not tax free.
Fifth, both the Supreme Court's opinion and the government's briefs
in Libson Shops stressed the limitation of carryovers under the language
of the 1939 Code to losses of the same "taxpayer." They also noted that
this language was omitted from the 1954 Code.64
It may be suggested that the courts have already crossed the bridge
of applying Libson Shops to cases governed by the 1954 Code. In sup-
port of this suggestion, it should be noted that several of the cases involve
deductions in 1954 and later years, even though the reorganizations oc-
curred earlier. It is submitted, however, that these cases are irrelevant to
the issue, as has been clearly set forth by the Tax Court in Huyler's. The
argument as to the effect of the 1954 Code on continuing entities turns
on the effect of section 382 (a). This subsection relates only to changes
in stock ownership and business which occurred after June 22, 1954,65
which is true of none of the cases so far decided.
To conclude that the judge-made change-of-stock-ownership and
change-of-business-operation tests would not apply under the 1954 Code,
since the 1954 Code already has statutory tests on the same points, does
not necessarily resolve the question as to insolvency reorganizations. It
should be remembered that the change-of-stock-ownership test has always
been applied in the insolvency cases in conjunction with a comment that
part of the corporation's debt burden was extinguished. It has also been
noted that the debt reduction factor is a legitimate policy consideration,
and that as a conceptual argument it has been successful in defeating the
carryover of earnings and profits. On the other hand, in the various
.other-contexts in which it is presented, the opposite result has generally
been reached.66 The overall pattern being one of continuity, a court pre-
sumably should hesitate to impose an inconsistent result in the loss carry-
over area by judicial legislation.6" Also, if it is held that section 381
does apply to some insolvency reorganizations involving a new corporate
64. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 384 nn.1 & 2 (1957). In view of the
changed statutory pattern, the change in language may not have been entirely inadvertent.
Also, it is understood that one of the grounds on which the government opposed a rehearing
in this case was that it clearly could not apply under the 1954 Code.
65. CODE 5 394(b).
66. See note 37 supra and following text.
67. The Treasury has ruled by implication that a loss carryover is allowed in an insolvency
recapitalization where debt is partly cancelled and partly exchanged for stock. Rev. Rul.
59-222, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 80, involved such a recapitalization, and it was held that, in effect,
CODE § 382 (a) did not bar the carryover. CODE § 382 (a) is not even relevant unless CODE §
172 applies, and that is the section on which the recent adverse decisions are based.
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